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COMMENTARIES ON PROFESSOR SNEED'S LECTURE
WALTER

J. B.-mr*

The task of a commentator is invariably more difficult when he agrees
with the views which have been presented. It is always easier to attack and more
stimulating to take issue. Unfortunately, I find myself in agreement with most
of what Sneed has said, and it is only my emphasis that is somewhat different.
First a general background note. I do not dissent from Sneed's proposition
that in the world of today, and most likely in the world of tomorrow, heavy
taxes will be with us and maintenance of our position of strength in the world
will require them. But I would insert an important caveat. I think we should
be careful that what Sneed calls our commitment to greatness is not used
as a cover for a wide variety of government activities which make a doubtful
contribution to our greatness. Otherwise, the political-economic system which
has produced our greatness might itself be weakened and, in the process, perhaps
also our greatness.
Turning to Sneed's central theme, no one can doubt that federal tax law
has had an important impact on private law and that the impact has taken the
three forms that Sneed has so clearly outlined. However, I suggest that his
presentation may possibly be misleading if it gives the impression that changes
in our private law attributable to our federal tax law bulk large. Substantial
they are; but not of giant proportions. In fact, the totality of change which
has occurred in our massive body of private law has itself been relatively
modest, and this is what might be expected in a society in which private
property plays a dominant role and which regards gradual change, rather
than revolutionary change, as a major virtue. Lawyers of my generation should
not be surprised to learn that while their law school course notes in taxation,
labor law and other public law fields are hopelessly outdated, the main body of
their notes in agency, torts, contracts, property and evidence probably need
only slight updating-provided, of course, they were reasonably well designed
at the start. And of that fraction of private law which has changed, I suggest
that only a relatively small part has been in response to tax stimuli. As a
convenient yardstick for this purpose, it might be observed that two much more
potent forces for change in recent decades have been, first, the move to promote
uniform private law throughout the states and, second, the ever present drive
in some quarters for further codification of decisional law. Nevertheless, it is
abundantly clear that the tax induced changes in private law are far from
insignificant.
Moving to Sneed's analysis, I cannot get very excited over the matters
covered by his first category-the distortion, corruption or reinforcement of
private law by tax law. The essence of these operations is clear. Courts
sometimes seize upon results in tax cases to justify a decision in a private law
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A. 1939, J.D. 1941, University of
Chicago.
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case without properly considering that the relevant purpose behind the tax
rule may be wholly different from the purpose to be served by the private law
rule. Sneed is sound in deploring this confusion even when by happenstance it
produces a desirable private law result. My lack of excitement over the
process is not due to disinterest. Rather it stems from the fact that this kind
of confusion can be found all over the judicial lot, and there is nothing
particularly novel or provoking when an undiscriminating opinion happens to
borrow wrongly from tax law rather than from some other area of law.
The amplification aspect of tax law's impact on private law, Sneed's
second category, is to me far more interesting. It is quite intriguing to watch
private law struggling to develop rules which are needed only because tax law
has posed questions that previously were unrecognized or lacked significance.
But in observing this process, we should remain aware that it is only one side
of a greater drama. Sharing the stage is the resourcefulness of taxpayers and
their advisors in working out the many tax savings arrangements which then
call for the amplification of private law. This resourcefulness on the part
of tax experts is perhaps most striking when an old form or old device, nearly
fallen into obscurity, is resurrected to live a new life under completely altered
circumstances. The revival of powers of appointment in estate planning serves
as a perfect illustration of this point. What I am urging here is that the wonders
of such virtuosity on the part of tax experts should not be neglected when we
concentrate on the amplification of private law. To a degree, the amplification
of private law is in response not only to taxes but to the ingenuity of tax
planners, spurred on by the tax law.
Regarding Sneed's third category, the creative response of private
law
to tax law, I would emphasize two points. First is the fact that the reaction
of state legislatures to a tax stimulus is often surprisingly slow considering its
pecuniary potency. It took years before more than a few states moved toward
shifting from a common law to a community property system of ownership
in order to gain the tax advantage of income splitting for their citizens. Again,
the divergent treatment for gift tax purposes of a renounced legacy, on the one
hand, and a rejected inheritance, on the other, was pretty old stuff before state
laws undertook to put them on an equal tax footing by authorizing the disclaimer. of property received through intestate succession. And to take another
of Sneed's illustrations, the gift tax implication of support obligations were well
publicized before proposed changes in state law appeared on the scene. This
is not to say the creative response is never rapid. The recent flood of professional
association legislation, following publication of Treasury regulations on the
subject, testifies forcefully to the contrary. On the whole, however, the pace
of reaction has been moderate and it is my guess that in relatively few instances
is it likely to be very swift. But whatever the speed of the legislative reaction,
I would not weaken Sneed's package of advice to tax law-makers and private
law-makers. His guidelines are fundamentally sound.
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The second point I would emphasize in connection with the creative aspect
of tax law is that the responses of private law are sometimes in themselves
distortions. They represent legislative decisions on private law matters which
probably would not have been acceptable in the absence of tax considerations.
What is good for taxation is not necessarily otherwise good for the country.
I am somewhat disappointed that time did not permit Sneed to develop
the point that tax law has spawned a sizable amount of friendly state-court
litigation designed to recast transactions or to reform instruments in order to
put the friendly group of litigants in a better federal tax position. Perhaps
only in a strained sense can such judicial activity be considered an alteration
of substantive private law. This sympathetic judicial response, however, has
an important bearing on the operation of our system of private law. It tends to
set a tone that is not easily forgotten. The actual magnitude of such sympathetic
response is very hard to gauge inasmuch as many of the decisions go unrecorded or unnoticed. But there is ample evidence that numerous state courts
have repeatedly been more than lenient, if not virtually compliant, in backstopping poor draftsmanship or bad planning, all at the expense of the federal
revenues. I cannot believe that such performances increase the prestige of the
judiciary or produce a desirable climate for the dispensation of justice.
Finally, I join Sneed in predicting that the processes of what he terms
fiscalizing our private law in response to tax law probably will continue unabated.
In many respects our federal tax system seems to have a dominant characteristic:
it continues to keep moving in the direction it is already going.
ERNEsT

J. BROWN*

I can't enter into whatever area of disagreement there may be between
Mr. Sneed and Mr. Blum on the amount or pace of change the tax law has
brought into private law. It exists, and that is perhaps the most significant
thing. I am interested in exploring elements which may be obvious. But it may
be of some advantage to make them explicit. These are the elements of the
framework of Mr. Sneed's very fruitful inquiry. It is, as so many things are
with us, an exploration into our federalism. Of course, it is nothing new to
have taxes and tax law influence private law and private institutions. The
feudal equivalent of taxation was at least one of the stimuli that ultimately
resulted in the law of trusts. In our own country when the Supreme Court
was unable to discover constitutional restraints of any great rigor on the
rather ambitious reach of state inheritance taxation and state franchise taxation,
the personal holding company emerged as a check on the former and the intricate
proliferation of subsidiary and affiliated business corporations helped to check
* Professor of Law and Chairman, Committee on Graduate Studies, Harvard
University Law School. A.B. 1927, Princeton University; LL.B. 1931, Harvard; former
Professor of Law (1937-42) and Assistant Dean (1946), University of Buffalo School
of Law.
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the latter. It is of interest, perhaps ironic interest, that the income tax in turn
made those institutions less useful by making them considerably more
expensive than they had been.
It is also true, as Mr. Sneed pointed out, that the tax law must reflect
the society on which it operates and its institutions, including some, but I
would emphasize not all, of its private law manifestations. But what makes
our problem noteworthy and really quite new as such things go is that it is
only within recent years, as at least some of us can remember, that the taxation
which has the heaviest and most immediate and-this I think is significantthe most highly conditioned, the most intricately conditioned impact on millions
of persons and corporations, is now federal taxation, whereas private law and
legal institutions are for the most part products of state government or in the
custody of state government. Now with two governments operating in the
same field, the problem, of course, is more difficult. If we are concerned with
state taxation and state law there is a possibility to coordinate, to adjust
the balance, if one seems to be overly important with respect to the other.
But the federal system produces a greater difficulty and, of course, it is much
enhanced when we consider that private law is the product not of one state
government but of fifty. I should say "for the most part," and that qualification
will be assumed, because, of course, there is some private federal law. This
seems to me, as it does to Mr. Sneed and perhaps to a lesser extent to Mr.
Blum, to be a new problem and since we have to deal with it, I would like to
explore for a moment how the approach might be organized.
First of all I take it we have to find the framework of the problem. Now
this is fairly simple. The constitution gives Congress the power to tax, and for
some time Congress has been exercising that power and I presume it will continue to do so. Article VI provides that federal law is controlling, and that
includes tax law. The second part of the framework is that so far as I know
there has never been a wholly neutral taxing statute. People react to fiscal
exactions, and when they are conditioned they react the more intricately. I
don't think you can have a fiscally fertile law which is institutionally sterile.
It can be the other way around very easily, but not fiscally fertile and
institutionally sterile. Those are the two major parts of the framework.
Now I don't take it that it is constitutionally amiss that Congress knows
and gives thought to the results, either in law or institutions, that a taxing law
may produce. Some of you may disagree with that, but the fact is it will produce
them, and I find it difficult to think that Congress is forbidden to use its
intelligence in imagining what the results will be. And in anything I say,
I am more concerned with the unintended results rather than the intended. I
may argue with the wisdom of specific Congressional action which does shape
local law, but that wisdom is for argument there, and I don't mean to impugn
the power.
If that is the framework of the problem, we must also decide what
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are the desiderata, what are the objectives. I can name two that seem to me
fairly important. You may not agree with them, but they are, I think, primary,
if you do. One is that federal tax law should be, as far as may be, uniform.
This isn't only because the Constitution suggests that at least some federal taxes
should be uniform, but because it is fair, wise and politic that federal taxation
should be so in its impact. Of course there are economic variations, but one
won't find many apologists for an explicitly checkerboard effect in federal
taxation.
The second desideratum is that the control of private law should, for
the most part, remain with the states. I am no herald of revolution, and I
assume that most of us think that it is, and should be for the states, considering
the variety and size of this country, in large areas to make their own decisions
for creativity, caution, differentiation and experimentation. This does not suggest
that every state's boundary is exactly ordained from on high, but they are
there and the country varies richly. We may want in many cases a greater
uniformity of private law. I am not against the Uniform Sales Act, either
new or old version, but I think most of us will assume that for the time it is
wise that the states should have a large degree of power in making these
decisions.
Now I don't think I am arguing for contradictory things, as it might
appear, because I am both for uniformity and for variety. If I were, they could
be adjusted and the problem of adjustment would, of course, be for someone,
probably Congress. But I think I am arguing for a uniform tax law which
permits variety in the states, and so I don't think that there is any inconsistency.
Now if my statement of the framework is correct, the responsibility,
I think, lies where responsibility usually lies, that is, where the power lies,
and that is with the federal government, if we are to achieve these objectives which
I at least assume we desire. I say federal government advisedly because that
includes Congress, the courts, including the Tax Court, of course, and the
administrators, and if Mr. Lubick isn't displeased, I will include the people who
propose statutes among the administrators. At least they can't enact them.
But on all three levels it seems to me that there is responsibility. Now that
responsibility is not easily assumed, and I am not saying that every failure is
shameful. Take those things we all admire: thought, wisdom, and restraint.
Sir Isaiah Berlin remarked a few years ago that there seemed to be a worldwide shortage in sages, and so not all difficulties will be overcome.
But let's turn to a few specifics that have been mentioned before. When
the institutions of private law vary fundamentally, of course, adjustment of the
tax law to be uniform in its impact is the more difficult. The obvious, the
conventional example, will be the difference between the community property
states and the common law states which existed for years. Both my predecessors
have mentioned that. Now as we all know there was a divergence which was
very significant, and as the rates in the graduation grew higher, the divergence
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grew more significant. Now where the responsibility for that lay originally,
I don't know. It wasn't explicit in the statute, but it was in the statute as
the Supreme Court read it in Poe v. Seaborn. Some of my colleagues would tell
you where I would put the responsibility if I conceived the result to be wrong.
We needn't explore that today; but whether it was Congress or the Court, after
the Court did it, it was certainly up to Congress to rectify the error either of
its own or the Supreme Court's making. It was unsupportable that the country
should be divided in this fashion. Now I think that Pennsylvania, Nebraska and
such other states as there were-and, as I recall, New York did a little exercise
in brinksmanship, too, and came close to the border-I think they were rash
in abandoning the centuries old heritage of common law property. Nevertheless,
the responsibility lay with Congress, and unless Congress was trying to induce
the adoption of community property law all over the country, as I can't believe
it was, then it had to do something about it. It did do something about it fairly
well and fairly effectively in 1948. It took a long time, but it did it.
With that
having become a quite fundamental policy, then it seems to me it is incumbent on the administrators and the judges not to reverse it by nibbling
away. And I use considerable restraint when I say that I think, for instance,
the Supreme Court was unwise in its quite casual decision in the Davis
case last spring which broadens the gap between the community property
and the common law states in the matter of the tax aspect of divorce settlements. I happen to know, because I read the government's brief, that the
brief is very restrained. The court went much further in giving the government
a victory that it didn't press for, than the request had been. The casual
manner with which the court said: "It's true it creates a difference between
common law and community property states," the casual nature with which
the court did that, seems to me, shall I say, unfortunate. The same decision
also magnified the tax aspect of divorce settlements, a difficult matter at best.
And again this was neither necessary nor in my estimation required.
Congress has made some mistakes. Professor Sneed mentions the marital
deduction and the allowance for dependents. Now here I think the responsibility
lies solely with Congress. I think it is clear that the crux of the purpose of
the marital deduction and the limitations on it are fairly simple. The draftsmen
and the Congress, which adopted their work, came up with an over-elaborate
device which may or may not have been someone's idea of a way to achieve
a fairly simple result, but experience has shown it to be a very unfortunate
and a very intricate and complicated device in which many difficulties have
grown up, most of them nonfunctional, most of them unrelated to the purpose
of the limitations on the marital deduction. This seems to me to have been
over-expertness become inexpertness. I also question whether Congress was
wise in its dealing with the stock option provision. On somewhat larger grounds,
it has done something which has induced a number of states to amend their
statutes, to take advantage of this rather questionable legislative bounty.
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The Hardenbergh Case which Mr. Sneed has mentioned is a case differentiating between renunciation of legacies and renunciation of an intestate's
succession. It is a case in which it seems to me that a court, the Tax Court
originally, fell into a trap, into a difficulty which a sense of judicial responsibility
should have avoided. It was faced, perhaps as I read between the lines of its
opinion, with a decision of a Court of Appeals with which it disagreed, in the
case of Brown v. Routzahn. Instead of facing that disagreement, it turned
to this quite specious difference between vesting subject to divesting and not
vesting at all. Now indeed it is almost inconceivable that any rational person
could have felt that this had any function to perform with respect to the
federal gift tax statute, whether the legatee or heir should or should not pay a
gift tax. But the Tax Court adopted it; it was affirmed by a different Court
of Appeals, and the tax differences are now such as to move the states to eliminate
at best a meaningless differentiation. Whether this should move the states or
whether it just differentiates the states seems to me not particularly significant.
'All I am saying is that with the difference turning on perhaps a bit of
terminology, and not much more than that in state law, it is certainly something
that a conscientious court might have turned away from.
When I say courts I should broaden the responsibility, because it is the
responsibility of lawyers as well. I take it that it is the first responsibility
of the lawyers in the Treasury and Department of Justice to administer the
tax law wisely. Their responsibility for winning cases lies within the ambit
of that first responsibility. They present such points to the federal courts, and
in doing so they certainly seem to me to be departing from that wise overall
policy of reconciling uniformity and diversity. I think both of these can be
achieved. We may ultimately want to do away with the diversity. But while
we have it, tax uniformity with diversity of law can be achieved. They do
take restraint and some measure of thought. But I for one don't think that
the achievement is likely to be inconsistent with the call to greatness which
Professor Sneed has mentioned.
DONALD C. LuBIcx*
Dean Hyman, the accident of alphabet makes it rather difficult for me
to add anything to the comments which we have been fortunate to receive from
three of the best and leading scholars in the tax legal field in the country.
However, I perhaps can bring you a message that is even better, since
yesterday my boss, the Secretary of the Treasury, emphasized that next year
we will have both lower taxes and greatness, and the sooner we have them,
the sooner I can get back to Buffalo. We have heard a good deal today about
the distortions of state law by federal tax rules. You may not know that
* Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury. A.B. 1945, University of
Buffalo; LL.B. 1949, Harvard University Law School; Lecturer in Law (1950-1960) University of Buffalo School of Law.
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in the expense account legislation which Dean Hyman has mentioned, we almost
had a distortion of federal tax law caused by rules of state substantive law.
At one stage the Senate Finance Committee voted to disallow all entertainment expenses except those which a prudent man might incur. After
a raft of editorials and speculation, Congress thought better of that idea and
retreated to the well established federal tax principles of "directly related"
and "associated with," which of course are time honored and clear.
I think Professor Sneed has well illustrated the fact of which many of us
practicing in the tax field have been aware that tax pressures do influence
results both in litigation and legislation in the development of legal rules, and
I think that even if our destiny for this century were not our commitment to
leadership of the free world that this would be true anyway. I think taxes play
such a significnt role in our economy that they are bound to have this effect.
As Professor Blum has pointed out, taxes are not unique in their effect
upon development of private substantive law. Changing social views and
economic pressures of all kinds have always shaped the development of
private law. Anyone; I think, can come up with a number of instances from
the law of torts, contracts or property. The first year law student case of
MacPherson v. Buick dealing with liability of manufacturers in tort, I think,
is an illustration of the impact of changing ideas and changing factors on
the development of private law. Often times familiar rules are distorted to
reach a particular result. Without giving a good bit of thought to it, I
recall my first year class in contracts from Professor Brown where we discussed
the charitable pledge cases where doctrines of consideration were changed and
yielded to pressures to reach a particular desirable result. So I agree largely
with Professor Blum that it is neither undesirable nor unexpected that tax
factors are going significantly to effect the development of our private law;
and I also agree, I think with all of my colleagues here, that the state courts
must follow precedents carefully, studying and applying prior decisions in their
proper context, but after all this is basically the best technique of the common
law process.
And of course where state substantive rights become significant for the
first time, as in the illustrations of the marital deduction cases, and the cases
involving the obligation of support, it is necessary for the courts to think
through and weigh carefully what they are doing. Again this is a phenomenon
which we can observe in many other areas. The influence of labor relations,
I dare say, has had a lot to do with the development of the law of third party
beneficiaries' rights to sue on collective bargaining agreements, and so forth.
Now I am most concerned, of course, at the present time with the legislative role in this process, and I agree that it is important to those engaged
in the legislative process not to pivot a significant tax distinction on insignificant
features of local law or those features which cannot simply bear the strain,
such as making significant tax consequences turn on definition of an obligation
266
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to support. I do want to say that for those engaged in the legislative process
at the federal level, it is, however, frequently difficult to see these issues clearly
enough, early enough, and I think I ought to defend for Professor Brown the
role of the draftsman in his legislative work. The professional draftsmen on
the Congressional committee staffs are unsung heroes, I think, of the tax
process. They are among the most capable, expert draftsmen that anyone could
ask for to be preparing vital legislation. They operate, however, under very
difficult conditions and pressures not only of time. Decisions are frequently made
by the Congressional committees in rather vague terms. A decision is made
that we ought to disallow entertainment expenses in certain categories, then
it is up to the draftsmen to fill in all of the chinks that have been left open, to
try, as faithfully as they can, to carry out the legislative intent. These men
are dedicated, hard working and excellent craftsmen. I think it is important that
you know that most of the ambiguous drafting that we undoubtedly have in
the Internal Revenue Code is not the fault of the draftsmen.
I would like to say a little bit about the role of the federal tax law in our
economy. I think I would agree wholeheartedly with Professor Brown that
our object is uniformity. We want to allocate the tax burden as fairly as possible among all of our citizens. However, we must recognize that, as Professor
Brown has said, the tax law can really never be neutral. And so I think it
is also desirable that the tax system be used to induce particular desirable
social or economic purposes where those purposes are tied to a broad popular
consensus of what is a desirable social purpose and that it be so used in situations where the tax law can be used appropriately to deal with the problem and
non-tax approaches are not as suitable.
Let me illustrate with a couple of examples. During the consideration of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the trade bill, there was a good deal of
pressure in order to provide tax benefits for industries and firms that were
injured by import competition, and one of the usual tax devices, if you will,
that, it was suggested, would be desirable in this situation is the five-year writeoff of the cost of equipment, or rapid depreciation. Now it seems to me that
this is a situation where there is a desirable social purpose, trying to help
import-injured industries and firms to re-adjust because of the governmental
action of changing tariffs which had allowed them to achieve a certain degree
of prosperity. However, it seems to me that this is a case where the appropriateness of using the tax system is limited. Proper aid to the import-injured
industries calls for a discrimination which it is not possible to achieve through
the tax system. For example, those businesses which were most hurt would be
ones that would be showing losses, and therefore an extra depreciation deduction
would not be of use to them. By granting them across the board, you might
help some, but much of the deductions would have been granted where not
needed. It was not possible to use the tax system in the discriminating way
that would be called for in that situation.
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On the other hand, perhaps the consensus is that the use of a deduction for
contributions to charitable organizations is a useful way to use the tax system
to influence decisions. It may be desirable to encourage private philanthropy
and to avoid close governmental regulation in these areas, and therefore we
may have a situation where the tax law quite properly can be used to induce
the particular result. Now this in turn, this tax policy, has certainly encouraged
the growth of charitable institutions, among them private foundations. Here
is an area where the states ought to respond to a federally tax induced situation to regulate, but the states have abdicated their responsibility. There have
been many cases of abuses of charitable foundations, and because the states
have not exercised control, it may be necessary again for the federal government to step in through changes in the tax system or otherwise.
I would agree finally with Professor Sneed that the economic interests and
pressures generated by the impact of taxation are such that we are always going
to have a vying to induce certain results through changes in the tax law. I
think I have a more optimistic view than he does. By and large I think that in
the end it is all going to work out all right. We have seen a period of a tax
structure with very high rates which has led to many inroads in the tax base
which have produced and created a lot of these distortions about which Professor Sneed has been talking, but I think the atmosphere is such and the consciousness of people in our country today is such that the pendulum is swinging the other way; and I think that now counterpressures have been set in
force which will induce a correction of some of these, the greatest of the distortions and an awareness of the possible effects of the tax law; and I think
that not only in the administrative end of government but in the legislative end
there is a new awareness of the problems requiring careful use of tax policy to
induce or prevent a tax inspired response. I can say again for the Secretary
that we are looking forward next year not only to a rate revision which will
mean a reduction in personal and corporate income taxes from top to bottom
but also a correction of some of the factors which have been productive of
some of the distortion; and hence we may expect toward a greater uniformity of
taxation than we have had in recent years, with more heed paid to the admonitions of Professor Sneed to weigh carefully the reaction which tax action will
induce.
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